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1. ‘Old’ and ‘new’ references to a socially oriented 
European integration in the Treaties: strengthening 
social cohesion by improving living conditions. 
Looking at the Treaty on European Union and at the Treaty on its 
functioning (hereafter, respectively, TEU and TFEU) as re-structured after 
Lisbon 2007, ‘old’ and ‘new’ references can be found within both which 
confirm that the social dimension is still present and has to play a 
relevant role within European integration. In fact the new text of art. 3 
(par. 3) reads: “The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall 
work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced 
economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market 
economy, aiming at full employment and social progress; (..) it shall 
combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social 
justice and protection; (..) it shall promote economic, social and 
territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States”
1 (art. 3, par. 3 
TEU). 
Assuming that the reference to a “social market economy” will, at 
least, differentiate the European economic model from the pure neoliberal 
one
2, one has to focus, above all, on social progress as main aim of the 
EU fighting against social exclusion and discrimination, while promoting 
social justice and protection, alongside the economic, social and territorial 
cohesion and solidarity among Member States. These are ambitious goals 
that, according to the more recent case law of the European Court of 
Justice
3 (hereafter ECJ), shall be considered influential even while 
                                                 
1 Emphasis always added. 
2 On the concept of “social market economy” and on its possible impact on European 
integration, see C. JOERGES, F. RÖDEL, Social Market Economy as Europe’s Social Model, EUI 
Working Papers LAW n. 2004/8 available at 
http://cadmus.iue.it/dspace/bitstream/1814/2823/1/law04-8.pdf. 
3 ECJ 11 December 2007, Case 438/05 International Transport Workers Federation; ECJ 18 
December 2007, Case 341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd.. Literature on both cases, their 
background and their consequences is already wide. See, at least, M. V. BALLESTRERO, ‘Le 
sentenze Viking e Laval: la Corte di giustizia “bilancia” il diritto di sciopero’, (2008) 2 Lavoro 
e diritto, 371; B. BERCUSSON, ‘The Trade Union Movement and the European Union: 
Judgement day’, (2007) European Law Journal, 279; B. CARUSO, ‘I diritti sociali nello spazio 
sociale sovranazionale e nazionale: indifferenza, conflitto o integrazione?’, WP C.S.D.L.E. 
“Massimo D'Antona” .INT - 61/2008; A. C. L. DAVIES, ‘One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? 
The Viking and Laval Cases in the ECJ’, (2008) 2 Industrial Law Journal, 126; E. EKLUND, 
‘The Laval Case’, (2006) 2 Industrial Law Journal, 202; P. A. KÖHLER, ‘“Vaxholm” – 
“Gustafsson” – “Evaldsson”: Das kollektive Arbeitsrecht Schwedens auf dem 
europarechtlichen Prűfstand’, (2008) ZESAR, 65; A. LO F ARO, Diritti sociali e libertà 
economiche del mercato interno: considerazioni minime in margine ai casi Laval e Viking, 
(2008) 1 Lavoro e Diritto, 71; T. NOVITZ, ‘The Right to Strike and re-flagging in the 
European Union: free movement provisions and human rights’, (2006) Lloyd’s Maritime and 4          EDOARDO ALES 
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implementing the internal market based on competition and fundamental 
freedoms. 
This new social awareness is confirmed by the introduction of the 
so called horizontal social clause, already provided within the aborted 
Constitutional Treaty, according to which: “In defining and implementing 
its policies and activities, the Union shall take into account requirements 
linked to the promotion of a high level of employment, the guarantee of 
adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a high 
level of education, training and protection of human health.” (art. 9 
TFEU). 
The fact that social progress and economic, social and territorial 
cohesion are missed from art. 9 TFEU has not to be overestimated since 
something similar to the above mentioned horizontal social clause was 
already provided within art. 159 par. 1 TEC, now art. 175 par. 1 TFEU, 
which reads: “(..) the formulation and implementation of the Union’s 
policies and actions and the implementation of the internal market shall 
take into account the objectives set out in Article 174 and shall contribute 
to their achievement”. As well known, art. 174 TFEU (once art. 158 TEC) 
states that: “in order to promote its overall harmonious development, the 
Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of 
its economic, social and territorial cohesion.”. 
The strengthening of economic, social and territorial cohesion has, 
therefore, to be considered an added horizontal goal to be pursued by the 
EU and the Member States, each one within the scope of its shared 
competence on the topic, as provided by art. 4 par. 2 TFEU. 
Being social among the other, the question is if cohesion may be 
achieved also by EU policies adopted under the scope of art. 151 TFEU 
(former art. 136 TEC) which reads that: “the Union and the Member 
States (..) shall have as their objectives (..) improved living and working 
conditions, so as to make possible their harmonisation while the 
improvement is being maintained (..).”. This is the case, in our opinion, 
since, according to art. 174 TFEU the strengthening of cohesion is 
pursued “in order to promote the overall harmonious development” of the 
EU, a mission which cannot be accomplished without improving living and 
                                                                                                                              
Commercial Law Quarterly, 242–256; M. PALLINI, ‘Law shopping e autotutela sindacale 
nell’Unione Europea, (2008) Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro, II, 3; R. REBHAHN, ‘Grundfreiheit 
vor Arbeitskampf – der Fall Viking’, (2008) ZESAR, 109; S. SCIARRA, ‘Viking e Laval: diritti 
collettivi e mercato nel recente dibattito europeo’, (2008) 2 Lavoro e Diritto, 245; F. 
TEMMING, ‘Das “schwedische Modell” auf dem Prűfstein in Luxemburg – der Fall Laval’, 
(2008) ZESAR, 231; LORD WEDDERBURN, ‘Labour Law 2008: 40 Years on’, (2007) Industrial 
Law Journal, 397; C. WOOLFSON, J. SOMMERS, ‘Labour Mobility in Construction: European 
Implications of the Laval un Partneri Dispute with Swedish Labour’, (2006) European Journal 
of Industrial Relations, 49. Transnational Wages Setting as a Key Feature of a Socially Oriented European Integration  5 
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working conditions at European level by harmonising them “while the 
improvement is being maintained”. 
2. Transnational harmonisation of wages as the main 
instrument of improvement of living conditions and the 
crucial role of collective action. 
Looking at the social objectives laid down by art. 151 TFEU, one 
may wonder if living and working conditions cannot be considered as a 
whole as far as community action is concerned. Indeed, since its 
beginning, i.e. in the Seventies, EU commitment towards harmonisation 
in the social field has exclusively focused on working conditions - the new 
competence on “the combating of social exclusion” introduced by the 
Treaty of Nice of 2001 being limited to the coordination of national 
inclusion policies (art. 137 TEC now art. 153, par. 1, lett. j TFEU). In this 
view, living conditions should have improved indirectly, by consequence 
of the harmonisation of (at their turn, hopefully improved) working 
conditions. These latter, however, as well known, cannot refer to wage 
(“pay”) because of the lack of EU competence on the subject under the 
social chapter (art. 153 par. 5 TFEU
4). 
On the other hand, undoubtedly, wage increase has to be 
considered one of the most significant parameters in evaluating the 
improvement of living conditions at transnational level. Therefore, the 
lack of competence in this field is likely to hinder the accomplishment of 
the EU mission as defined by art. 151 TFEU. Neither such a lack can be 
compensated by the role Social Partner are suppose to play according to 
art. 154 TFEU
5, since such a role is clearly limited to the competences 
recognised to the EU by art. 153, par. 1 TFEU. 
However, this does not mean that, even “at Union level”
6, 
collective action carried out by trade unions outside the scope of art. 154 
                                                 
4 Art. 153 par. 5 TFEU reds: “The provisions of this Article shall not apply to pay, the right 
of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lock-outs.”. 
5 Art. 154 TFEU reds: “1. The Commission shall have the task of promoting the consultation 
of management and labour at Union level and shall take any relevant measure to facilitate 
their dialogue by ensuring balanced support for the parties. 2 .  T o  t h i s  e n d ,  b e f o r e  
submitting proposals in the social policy field, the Commission shall consult management 
and labour on the possible direction of Union action. (..)”. 
6 See art. 155 TFEU which reds: “1. Should management and labour so desire, the dialogue 
between them at Union level may lead to contractual relations, including agreements. 2. 
Agreements concluded at Union level shall be implemented either in accordance with the 
procedures and practices specific to management and labour and the Member States or, in 
matters covered by Article 153, at the joint request of the signatory parties, by a Council 
decision on a proposal from the Commission. The European Parliament shall be informed. 
(..).”. 6          EDOARDO ALES 
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TFEU shall not be considered as the most relevant and effective tool in 
order to increase wage standards and thus to improve living conditions. 
On the contrary, taken into account the exclusion provided by the above 
mentioned art. 153, par. 5, collective action has to be deemed to be the 
sole legitimate tool for transnational wage setting within the EU Law 
perspective. 
3. Collective action as fundamental right at EU level: 
the legal background. 
This can be considered one of the reasons why the reaffirmation of 
the right of collective bargaining and action within art. 28 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the EU (hereafter CFREU)
7 has been 
optimistically welcomed as decisive in view of eventually providing 
collective action with a clear status at EU level. However one may wonder 
if this is really the case. 
A first question that has been risen immediately after the solemn 
proclamation of the CFREU on December 2000 in Nice was referred to its 
legal value. This question has now been answered by art. 6, par. 1 TEU 
which recognised to the CFREU “the same legal value as the Treaties” 
adding that “the provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the 
competences of the Union as defined in the Treaties.”. 
This leads to the second double question that, on the contrary, still 
remains open - to what extent “Community law” can limit “the right to 
negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels 
and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend 
their interests, including strike action”? What if “national laws and 
practices”, also referred to in art. 28, are in conflict with “Community 
Law”? 
To the last part of the question the answer seems to be the 
prevalence of “Community law” on national laws and practice, as recently 
confirmed by art. 1, par. 7 dir. 2006/123 which reads: “This Directive 
does not affect the exercise of fundamental rights as recognised in the 
Member States and by Community law. Nor does it affect the right to 
negotiate, conclude and enforce collective agreements and to take 
industrial action in accordance with national laws and practices which 
respect Community law.”. 
                                                 
7 Art. 28 CFREU reads: “Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in 
accordance with Community law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and 
conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of 
interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.”. Transnational Wages Setting as a Key Feature of a Socially Oriented European Integration  7 
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The first part of the question seems to be more difficult to answer, 
above all if we take into account art. 52, par. 1 CFREU which reads: “Any 
limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this 
Charter must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those 
rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, 
limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet 
objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to 
protect the rights and freedoms of others.”. Limitation by law, the respect 
of the essence of the right and of the principles of proportionality, 
necessity and general interest have to be considered conditional to any 
kind of restriction the same definition of a fundamental right can afford. 
If such a conclusion perfectly fits to the fundamental nature 
recognised to all the rights (and freedoms) reaffirmed by the CFREU, it 
fits even more to the right of collective action that, has we have tried to 
demonstrate in the above, can be considered, at the moment and 
probably also for the future, the only mean by which the harmonisation of 
living conditions, while the improvement has being maintained, can be 
achieved at EU level. The fact that, according to art. 34, par. 3 CFREU, 
“In order to combat social exclusion and poverty, the Union recognises 
and respects the right to social and housing assistance so as to ensure a 
decent existence for all those who lack sufficient resources, in accordance 
with the rules laid down by Community law and national laws and 
practices” has now to be confronted with the statement that “the 
provisions of the Charter shall not extend in any way the competences of 
the Union as defined in the Treaties.” (art. 6, par. 1 TEU). Indeed, the 
recognition and the respect of such a right (if already existing at national 
level) does not mean that EU competences in the field go beyond the 
coordination perspective provided by the already mentioned art. 153 
TFEU as far as the “the combating of social exclusion” and the 
“modernisation of social protection systems” are concerned. 
Therefore, one may wonder if, after the coming into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty, particularly art. 6, par. 1, the ECJ could still reach the 
same conclusions recently reached in the already mentioned ITWF and 
Laval cases at least with regard to what we may call the ‘fundamental 
right argument’. In fact, from the moment the Lisbon Treaty will be 
ratified by all Member States, the ECJ will have to test any kind of 
limitation to the right of collective action, whether provided by 
“Community law” of by “national legislations and practices”, against the 
above mentioned conditions required by art. 52, par. 1 CFREU, i.e. 
limitation by law, the respect of the essence of the right and of the 
principles of proportionality, necessity and general interest. Thus just 
reversing the way of reasoning adopted till now, according to which 8          EDOARDO ALES 
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collective action has to be seen as a limitation to the exercise of 
fundamental freedoms and therefore to be warranted and allowed “only if 
(a) it pursues a legitimate objective compatible with the Treaty 
(protection of workers) and (b) is justified by overriding reasons of public 
interest (protection of workers); if that is the case, (c) it must be suitable 
for securing the attainment of the objective which it pursues (suitability 
or appropriateness) and (d) not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain it (proportionality)”
8. 
However, since, at the time of writing, the Treaty of Lisbon has 
not yet come into force – and we do not know if it will, taking into 
account the Irish decision to ratify it by a referendum – it is worth to 
propose some reasoning about the (highly questionable) way by which 
the ECJ has approached the subject of the right of collective action, i.e. 
the only mean by which harmonisation of living conditions, while the 
improvement is maintained, can be achieved at EU level. 
4. Fundamental freedoms as limits and conditions for 
collective action in transnational wage setting at EU 
level: ITWF, Laval and Rűffert. 
As well known, the ECJ has been called to pronounce three times 
in less then six months on the legitimate exercise of collective action 
which was de facto conditioning and allegedly limiting the freedom of 
establishment and, above all, the freedom to provide transnational 
services by posting workers of an enterprise. In all the three cases, ITWF, 
Laval and Rűffert
9, at stake was the request of (maintaining) working 
conditions which differ from those ones afforded by the employer to the 
workers. Nevertheless, only in ITWF such a claim was directly supported 
by the Union representing the workers concerned against an employer 
(Viking) who wanted to reflag one of its ships just to be able to apply 
Estonian working conditions instead of Finnish ones, thus reducing the 
existing wage standards. In Laval and Rűffert, indeed, the anti-dumping 
concern had led, in the fist, the Swedish legislature to let the Swedish 
unions free to try to impose a bargaining on wages as far as (Latvian) 
posted workers were concerned, and, in the second, the German 
(regional) legislature to ask for the application of local collective 
agreements as a condition to be fulfilled by enterprises that wanted to 
compete for a public procurement procedure. 
                                                 
8 ECJ ITWF, n. 75; Laval n. 101. On the questionable relevance of the principle of balancing 
see below par. 4.1. 
9 ECJ 3 April 2008 Case 346/06 Rűffert. Transnational Wages Setting as a Key Feature of a Socially Oriented European Integration  9 
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If in ITWF the solidarity strike called by the International 
Transport Workers Federation was asked by the Finnish trade union in 
order to support its collective action directly brought against the Finnish 
ship-owner Viking, in Laval, solidarity collective action was the sole mean 
by which the Swedish unions might try to convince Laval un Partneri to 
get involved in a negotiation its workers cannot ask for due to the 
existence of an ad hoc collective agreement quickly signed in Latvia. 
However, it is apparent that in all the three cases the ultimate 
goal of trade unions and legislatures was to avoid that the exercise of a 
fundamental freedom by the relevant employer will have as a direct or 
indirect side effect the worsening of wage standards and, consequently, 
of living conditions, thus contradicting the principle of ‘harmonisation in 
the improvement’ laid down in art. 151, par. 1 TFEU. 
In ITWF the effect would have been direct, since lower Estonian 
wage conditions would have applied to Finnish workers. In Laval and 
Rűffert it would have been indirect, by pushing Swedish and German 
employers to question collectively bargained (national or regional) wage 
standards in order to be able to compete with enterprises coming from 
(new) Member States with lower living conditions. On the other hand, 
opting for the prevalence of the interest of the posting enterprise not to 
modify its wage conditions will mean to provide it with a competitive 
advantage which can be challenged under the just recalled principle of 
‘harmonisation in the improvement’. The same will happen by allowing a 
Finnish ship-owner to reflag a ship only because of the convenience it 
may have in terms of wage lower conditions. 
In this view, also the establishment of the principle of “minimum 
rates of pay” by art. 3, par. 1 of EC directive 96/71 on posted workers
10, 
which has to be guaranteed by the employer whatever the country of 
origin of the worker, does not seems to be effective in order to avoid that 
instead of producing the ‘harmonisation in the improvement’ European 
integration will reduce itself to a race to the bottom for working and thus 
living conditions. On this point we will come back later, dealing with some 
reform scenarios. Now it is time to focus on how the ECJ has approached 
the issue of the clash between the fundamental right of collective action 
and market freedoms. 
First of all we have to highlight that, as recently and brilliantly 
reminded by Antonio Lo Faro
11, both ITWF and Laval a r e  f r u i t s  o f  t h e  
                                                 
10 On that point see G. ORLANDINI, ‘I diritti dei lavoratori migranti nell’ambito del mercato dei 
servizi’, in S. GIUBBONI and G. ORLANDINI (eds.), La libera circolazione dei lavoratori 
nell’Unione europea, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007), 85. 
11 See A. LO FARO, ‘Diritti sociali e libertà economiche del mercato interno’, 71. 10          EDOARDO ALES 
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poisoned tree of Rush Portuguesa
12 in which the ECJ, due to the fact that, 
at that time, art. 39 TEC (now art. 45 TFEU) on free movement for 
workers was not applicable to Portugal, consequently referred to art. 49 
TEC (now art. 56 TFEU) in order to avoid that a Portuguese firm would be 
obliged to hire French workers as a condition to operate in France. 
Workers protection against discrimination based on nationality was the 
aim, not social dumping. This was recognised by the same ECJ when 
affirming that: “Community law does not preclude Member States from 
extending their legislation, or collective labour agreements entered into 
by both sides of industry, to any person who is employed, even 
temporarily, within their territory, no matter in which country the 
employer is established; nor does Community law prohibit Member States 
from enforcing those rules by appropriate means.”
13. 
Unfortunately, the positive intent of protecting workers which 
moved the ECJ to look beyond art. 39 in order to find another reliable 
juridical basis for its anti-discriminatory discourse, opened the way to a 
total (and unintended?) overlapping of art. 39 by art. 49 which became 
the one and only provision of the Treaty to refer to in order to define the 
legal and contractual treatment applicable to (temporary) transnational 
provision of work. 
This was even more regrettable since only one year later in 
S￿ger
14 the ECJ affirmed that art. 49: “requires not only the elimination 
of all discrimination against a person providing services on the ground of 
his nationality but also the abolition of any restriction, even if it applies 
without distinction to national providers of services and to those of other 
Member States, when it is liable to prohibit or otherwise impede the 
activities of a provider of services established in another Member State 
where he lawfully provides similar services.”. Not surprisingly, since the 
same reasoning had been proposed by the ECJ three years before in Daily 
Mail and General Trust referring to art. 43 TEC (now art. 49 TFEU)
15. 
Therefore, in the understanding of the ECJ, both provisions cannot 
be seen anymore as antidiscrimination rules in the sense that they secure 
the same treatment for national and non national enterprises moving 
abroad. On the contrary, by claiming for the “abolition of any restriction”, 
they allow the discrimination of enterprises from the host Country which 
are committed to national collective agreements and the discrimination of 
                                                 
12 ECJ 27 March 1990 Case113/89, Rush Portuguesa, ECR 1990, I-01417. 
13 ECJ Rush Portuguesa, n. 18. 
14 ECJ 25 July 1991 Case 76/90, Manfred S￿ger, ECR 1991, I-04221, n. 12. 
15 ECJ 27 September 1988, C-81/87, The Queen v. H. M. Treasury and Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue, ex parte Daily Mail and General Trust plc., ECR 1988, 05483. Transnational Wages Setting as a Key Feature of a Socially Oriented European Integration  11 
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workers from the Country of origin who cannot benefit from the highest 
wage standards in case paid to workers from the host Country. 
In such a perspective, the already mentioned art. 3, par. 1, 
directive n. 96/71, obliging Member States to guarantee, within the 
“nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection”
16, “minimum rates 
of pay”, is likely to produce at least three negative effects: firstly, by 
excluding posted workers from the enjoyment of the equal treatment 
principle provided for by art. 39 to migrant workers, simply because they 
are not employed by an enterprise based in the host Country; secondly, 
by obliging trade unions to bargain a minimum rate of pay at national 
level in order to avoid the legislature to intervene on wages, thus 
interfering in a field traditionally ruled by collective bargaining; thirdly, by 
call into question the same legitimacy of collective action aimed at 
obtaining higher wages for posted workers and to avoid the above 
mentioned race to the bottom. 
4.1 Limitations in purposes and contents for collective action after 
ITWF and Laval. 
As confirmed by Laval, the combination of the controversial 
interpretation of art. 49 with the “minimum rates of pay” principle is 
likely to deeply affect the very essence of the right of collective action i.e. 
the free definition, by trade unions, of the purposes and of the contents 
of the bargaining process and, thus, when needed, of industrial action. 
Which is totally against “national legislations and practices” of all Member 
States, even those providing the more restrictive regulations on strike
17. 
As a matter of fact, none of them is prohibiting collective bargaining and 
action if these are aimed at the conclusion of a collective agreement
18, 
this being the case both in ITWF and Laval. 
Therefore, it is worth explaining how it has been possible for the 
ECJ to reach this socially unacceptable conclusion by briefly analysing the 
reasoning followed in ITWF and, above all, in Laval. 
First, by summarily affirming the existence of a horizontal direct 
effect
19 of art. 49 TEC, thus applicable also to trade unions as 
                                                 
16 ECJ Laval, n. 108. 
17 As it would happen in Italy, for instance. On this point see G. ORLANDINI, ‘Considerazioni 
sulla disciplina del distacco dei lavoratori stranieri in Italia’, (2008) Rivista Italiana di Diritto 
del Lavoro, I, 73–74. 
18 This seems to be the case now also for solidarity action as witnessed by a recent decision 
from the German Bundesarbeitsgericht (19.6.2007, 1 AZR 396/06) according to which also 
this form of action falls within the scope of application of art. 9 par. 3 Grundgesetz (the 
German Constitution) and, within the usual limit of Verh￿ltnism￿ßigkeit, is therefore 
legitimate. 
19 ECJ Laval, n. 98; as for the horizontal direct effect of art. 43 TEC see ECJ ITWF, n. 66. 12          EDOARDO ALES 
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“associations or organisations not governed by public law”. They are 
then, on the one hand, equalise to “bodies governed by public law”, but, 
on the other seen as “bodies not governed by public law” when it comes 
“to avail themselves of that provision (art. 3, par. 10 dir. n. 96/71) by 
citing grounds of public policy in order to maintain that collective action 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings complies with Community 
law” (Laval n. 84). So that, trade unions has to comply with art. 49 as, in 
relation to it, they are assimilated to “bodies governed by public law”, but 
they cannot avail themselves of the provision laid down by art. 3, par. 10 
- according to which Member States, for grounds of public policy, may 
apply terms and conditions of employment on matter other than those 
referred to in art. 3, par. 1 of the directive - as, in relation to it, they are 
not considered “bodies governed by public law”. Which sounds at least 
paradoxical
20. 
Second, collective action falls within the scope of application of 
art. 49
21, no exemption being allowed under: (a) the lack of competence 
argument; (b) the fundamental right argument, (c) the Albany argument. 
Let us analyse them separately, using the same wording of the ECJ. 
(a) “In this regard, it suffices to point out that, even though, in 
the areas in which the Community does not have competence, the 
Member States remain, in principle, free to lay down the conditions for 
the existence and exercise of the rights at issue, they must nevertheless 
exercise that competence consistently with Community law (..). 
Therefore, the fact that Article 137 EC does not apply to the right to 
strike or to the right to impose lock-outs is not such as to exclude 
collective action such as that at issue in the main proceedings from the 
domain of freedom to provide services.”. Which seems to be convincingly 
consistent with the wording of art. 137, par. 5 that reads: “The provisions 
of this Article does not apply to (..).”
22. 
(b) “(..) the exercise of the fundamental rights (..) does not fall 
outside the scope of the provisions of the Treaty. Such exercise must be 
reconciled with the requirements relating to rights protected under the 
Treaty and in accordance with the principle of proportionality (..). It 
follows from the foregoing that the fundamental nature of the right to 
take collective action is not such as to render Community law inapplicable 
                                                 
20 For an opposite view, see S. Sciarra, ‘Viking e Laval’, 262 - 263. Our view is shared by M. 
V. Ballestrero, ‘Le sentenze Viking e Laval’, 388. 
21 ECJ Laval, nn. 87 - 88 and 95; and under the scope of application of art. 43: see ECJ 
ITWF, n. 55. 
22 ECJ ITWF, n. 41; Laval n. 88. According to S. S CIARRA, ‘Viking e Laval’, 258-259, the 
problem is the lack of a Community legislation, compatible with the internal market, 
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to such action, taken against an undertaking established in another 
Member State which posts workers in the framework of the transnational 
provision of services.”
23. A vision that can be shared only if the limitations 
on the exercise of the right to take collective action are provided for by 
law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, subject to 
the principle of proportionality, these limitations are necessary and 
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or 
the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others (as for art. 52 
CFREU). 
(c) “(..) It cannot be considered that it is inherent in the very 
exercise of trade union rights and the right to take collective action that 
those fundamental freedoms will be prejudiced to a certain degree.”
24. A 
summary and unmotivated statement clearly contradicted by all Member 
States’ legislations and practices, according to which a certain limitation 
of market freedoms must be considered inherent to the very essence of 
the right to take collective action. 
Third, “the right of trade unions of a Member State to take 
collective action by which undertakings established in other Member 
States may be forced to sign the collective agreement for the building 
sector – certain terms of which depart from the legislative provisions and 
establish more favourable terms and conditions of employment as 
regards the matters referred to in Article 3(1), first subparagraph, (a) to 
(g) of Directive 96/71 and others relate to matters not referred to in that 
provision – is liable to make it less attractive, or more difficult, for such 
undertakings to carry out construction work in Sweden, and therefore 
constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services within the 
meaning of Article 49 EC.”
25. Here we can really grasp how deep the 
combination of the S￿ger formula with the “minimum rates of pay” 
principle is affecting the very essence of the right of collective action. 
Being this kind of collective action considered as a restriction on 
the freedom to provide services (and of establishment, in the ITWF case), 
this can be warranted “only if (a) it pursues a legitimate objective 
compatible with the Treaty and (b) is justified by overriding reasons of 
public interest; if that is the case, (c) it must be suitable for securing the 
attainment of the objective which it pursues (suitability or 
                                                 
23 ECJ ITWF, n. 47; Laval, n. 95. 
24 ECJ ITWF, n. 51–54. On the relationship between competition and solidarity at EU level 
from an Italian perspective, see S. SCIARRA (ed.), Solidarietà, mercato e concorrenza nel 
welfare italiano. Profili di diritto interno e comunitario, (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007); M. CORTI, 
Contrattazione collettiva, libera circolazione e concorrenza in Europa, (2007) Rivista 
Giuridica del Lavoro, I, 773. 
25 ECJ Laval, n. 99. 14          EDOARDO ALES 
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appropriateness) and (d) not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain it (proportionality)”
26. 
Furthermore, “since the Community has thus
27 not only an 
economic but also a social purpose, the rights under the provisions of the 
Treaty on the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital (e) 
must be balanced against the objectives pursued by social policy, which 
include, as is clear from the first paragraph of art. 136 EC, inter alia, 
improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their 
harmonisation while improvement is being maintained, proper social 
protection and dialogue between management and labour (balancing).”
28. 
(a-b) Fortunately, protection of workers is considered by the ECJ 
as a legitimate objective/overriding reason of public interest and “in 
principle, blockading action by a trade union of the host Member State 
which is aimed at ensuring that workers posted in the framework of a 
transnational provision of services have their terms and conditions of 
employment fixed at a certain level, falls within the objective of 
protecting workers.”
29. But … “(..) with regard to workers posted in the 
framework of a transnational provision of services, their employer is 
required, as a result of the coordination achieved by Directive 96/71, to 
observe a nucleus of mandatory rules for minimum protection in the host 
Member State.”
30. Therefore collective action by a trade union of the host 
Member State will be justified in the light of the public interest objective 
(protection of workers) only if it is aimed at obliging an undertaking 
established in another Member State to comply as regards minimum 
pay
31. In fact, as already highlighted in the above, “not being (trade 
unions) bodies governed by public law, they cannot avail themselves of 
that provision (art. 3, par. 10 dir. n. 96/71) by citing grounds of public 
policy in order to maintain that collective action such as that at issue in 
the main proceedings complies with Community law.”
32. 
(c) Fortunately again “(..) it should be borne in mind that it is 
common ground that collective action, like collective negotiations and 
collective agreements, may, in the particular circumstances of a case, be 
one of the main ways in which trade unions protect the interests of their 
members.”
33. Thus, at least collective negotiations and collective 
                                                 
26 ECJ ITWF, n. 75; Laval n. 101. 
27 Reference has to be made to former art. 3, par. 1 TEC repealed and replaced, in 
substance, by art. 3 to 6 on competences – see also art. 3, par. 3 TEU. 
28 ECJ ITWF, n. 79, Laval n. 105. 
29 ECJ Laval, n. 107. 
30 ECJ Laval, n. 108. 
31 ECJ Laval, n. 109 and 110. 
32 ECJ Laval, n. 84. 
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agreements, seem to be inherently suitable and appropriate as 
restrictions to the exercise of fundamental freedoms which are aimed at 
protecting workers’ interests. Something very close to the Albany 
argument. 
(d) When it eventually comes to the proportionality test, its 
relevance has to be accurately evaluated. According to the ECJ “(..) it is 
for the national court to examine, in particular, on the one hand, 
whether, under the national rules and collective agreement law applicable 
to that action” the trade union involved “did not have other means at its 
disposal which were less restrictive of freedom of establishment in order 
to bring to a successful conclusion the collective negotiations entered 
into” with the relevant employer, “and, on the other, whether that trade 
union had exhausted those means before initiating such action.”
34. Only 
apparently the ECJ is relying on national rules, where existing, in order to 
decide whether collective action does not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to attain the objective it pursues. Indeed, by asking the national 
judge to verify if the trade union involved “did not have other means at 
its disposal which were less restrictive of freedom of establishment in 
order to bring to a successful conclusion the collective negotiations 
entered into” and “whether that trade union had exhausted those means 
before initiating such action”, the ECJ is de facto introducing a last resort 
principle against which every transnational collective action has to be 
tested
35 - before it takes place, if that trade union want to escape any 
damage liability. 
(e) Within such a conditional framework, one may ask whether the 
principle of balancing, finally affirmed by the ECJ, will be somehow 
beneficial to trade unions who want to engage in a legitimate 
transnational collective negotiations or action
36. To be honest, it does not 
seem it could be anyhow influential in passing the justification test all the 
restrictions to the exercise of fundamental freedom shall be submitted to. 
Balancing the rights under the provisions of the Treaty on the free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capital against the objectives 
pursued by social policy will thus remain meaningless until when it will be 
possible to test – the other way round - the socially irresponsible exercise 
of fundamental freedom against the principles laid down by art. 52 CFREU 
                                                 
34 ECJ ITWF, n. 87. 
35 See on it M. V. BALLESTRERO, ‘Le sentenze Viking e Laval, 379 and 383. 
36 The same question, followed by a negative answer, is adressed by M. V. B ALLESTRERO, 
‘Europa dei mercati e promozione dei diritti’, WP C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.INT – 
55/2007, 20 ff. 16          EDOARDO ALES 
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as a restriction to the exercise of collective action as a fundamental 
right
37. 
5. Collective action and wages: negative effects of the 
EU hidden competence under the fundamental freedom 
chapter. 
What seems to follow from the foregoing, is the existence of a 
hidden competence on collective action and on wages under the 
fundamental freedom chapter, deriving, on the one hand, from the 
already recalled combination of the controversial interpretation of art. 49 
as a discriminatory provision
38 with the “minimum rates of pay” principle 
laid down by art. 3 par. 1 directive 96/71, and, on the other, from the 
paradoxical consequences produced by the summarily affirmed horizontal 
direct effect of art. 43 and 49 TCE, not accompanied, at least in the case 
of posting, by the recognition to trade unions of the right to cite grounds 
of public policy (protection of workers) in order to widen the scope of 
collective action otherwise restricted to a “nucleus of mandatory rules for 
minimum protection”
39 by the above mentioned directive. 
Furthermore, as a restriction on the exercise of fundamental 
freedoms, collective action has to be – beforehand – evaluated according 
to the last resort principle in order to pass the proportionality test. 
From a socially oriented perspective of the European integration at 
least two criticisms has to be moved to the legitimate exercise of such a 
hidden competence. The first falls under the ‘essence of fundamental 
right’ argument. Restricted in its scope and legitimacy as described in the 
above, the right to collective action can hardly be considered secured in 
its very essence as required by art. 52 CFREU. The second falls under the 
‘harmonisation in the improvement’ argument. Indeed the benefit the 
“minimum rates of pay” principle is likely to bring to posted workers is 
not comparable to the damages the same principle is likely to cause to 
the free exercise of collective action in terms of obliging trade unions of 
the host Member State to bargain, nationally, on a minimum level basis. 
This, as clearly shown by Rűffert, calls into question the very existence of 
wage standards which exceed that level, also for national workers of the 
sector of industry involved. 
To the just drawn picture we have to add the lack of EU 
competence under the social policy chapter on wage (“pay”) and 
collective action. Reality shows that it has been short-sighted of European 
                                                 
37 See on it B. CARUSO, ‘I diritti sociali’, 35. 
38 See above par. 4. 
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trade unions to stand for the exclusion of those subjects from the EU 
social competences. In fact this has not meant the exclusion of EU 
intervention under the market freedom chapter. It has only made now 
impossible for a hypothetical political will to oppose to the ECJ dealing 
with social issues as mere restrictions on the exercise of fundamental 
freedoms, thus to be submitted to the justification test. 
6. “Minimum rates of pay” or equal treatment for 
posted workers? Weighing up pros and cons in a 
transnational bargaining perspective. 
It is clear that the “minimum rates of pay” principle does not fit to 
the vision of a socially oriented European integration we have advocated 
in the above
40. The same principles which support that vision in the 
Treaties will rather suggest the equal treatment principle for substitute to 
it as far as the definition of working conditions of posted workers is 
concerned. Indeed, the ‘harmonisation in the improvement’ of living 
condition and the strengthening of economic and social cohesion at EU 
level which will follow it, would be more effectively achieved by securing 
to posted workers the same wage conditions national workers usually 
enjoy. Moreover, equal treatment will also led to the “abolition of any 
discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member 
States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of 
work and employment”, inherent to the freedom of movement for 
workers within the EU (art. 45, par. 1 and 2)
41. 
Therefore, if EU wishes to move towards a more socially oriented 
integration, a substantive modification o f  a r t .  3  p a r .  1  d i r e c t i v e  9 6 / 7 1  
seems to be crucial. Otherwise it will be recommendable for trade unions 
and for those member States who have already adopted that principle, 
Italy for instance, to lodge a claim in front of the ECJ in order to ask for 
the withdrawal of art. 3, par. 1 because its conflict with art. 45, par. 1 
and 2, art. 151, par. 1 and art. 174 TFEU. 
On the other hand, it is clear that the competitive advantage of 
undertakings based in Member States with a lower wage standards will 
vanish as a result of the introduction of the equal treatment principle 
between national and posted workers. In the opinion of many, this has to 
be considered unacceptable because of its negative consequences on the 
employment opportunities of workers coming from the new Member 
                                                 
40 See above, par. 1. 
41 On this point see also art. 18, par. 1 TFEU which reads: “Within the scope of application 
of the Treaties, and without prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.”. 18          EDOARDO ALES 
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States. However, by accepting such a criticism one assumes companies 
can compete only on labour cost, which is obviously neither true nor 
recommendable. 
Also the anti-protectionist argument has to be rejected, given 
that, defending a higher level of workers protection by demanding other 
Member States and enterprises to increase their protective standards will 
serve the cause of achieving the ‘harmonisation in the improvement’ of 
living condition and the strengthening of economic and social cohesion at 
EU level which will follow it. 
Problems linked to the overall financial sustainability of a straight 
introduction of the equal treatment principle for posted workers could be 
taken into the due consideration and faced in a less drastic way by 
stimulating social partners at national and European level to develop 
forms of transnational collective bargaining aimed at first reducing and 
then gradually filling the existing wage gap
42. 
Such objectives have been developed by the European 
Commission within the Social Agenda 2005 - 2010
43 according to which: 
“In the EU, there is still considerable potential for facilitating 
improvements in quality and productivity through more intensive 
cooperation between economic players. Providing an optional framework 
for transnational collective bargaining at either enterprise level or sectoral 
level: (a) could support companies and sectors to handle challenges 
dealing with issues such as work organisation, employment, working 
conditions, training. (b) It will give the social partners a basis for 
increasing their capacity to act at transnational level. It will provide an 
innovative tool to adapt to changing circumstances, and provide cost-
effective transnational responses. Such an approach is firmly anchored in 
the partnership for change priority advocated by the Lisbon strategy. The 
Commission plans to adopt a proposal designed to make it possible for 
the social partners to formalise the nature and results of transnational 
collective bargaining. The existence of this resource is essential but its 
use will remain optional and will depend entirely on the will of the social 
partners.”. 
                                                 
42 For a sceptical position on this point see W. STREECK, ‘The Internationalisation of 
Industrial Relations in Europe: Prospects and Problems’, (1998) Politics & Society, 429, who 
was pleading for a growing convergence between national bargaining systems in order to 
cope with their diminishing capacity to “override and correct market forces” (452). The 
solution proposed in the text is supported by B. CARUSO, ‘I diritti sociali’, 40 and by R. PESSI, 
‘Diritto del lavoro: bilancio di un anno tra bipolarismo e concertazione’, Dipartimento di 
Scienze Giuridiche, Collana Studi, n. 5, (Padova: CEDAM, 2008), 88. 
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At the time of writing the Commission has not yet adopted its 
proposal and it is very unlikely it will do it in a near future, any reference 
to transnational collective bargaining being absent from the Renewed 
Social Agenda
44. Nevertheless, in 2004, the Commission selected a group 
of independent experts asking them to deliver a juridical study on an 
optional European framework for transnational collective bargaining
45. 
The study has been presented on May 2005 to social partners and still 
represents a useful contribution for an open debate
46. 
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